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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COVID-19 AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: GETTING AMERICANS
SAFELY BACK TO RESTAURANTS, THEATERS, GYMS, AND
“NORMAL”
FRANK GRIFFIN*
ABSTRACT
COVID-19 permanently changed the way places of public accommodation
like restaurants, theaters, medical facilities, arenas, gyms, and many other
proprietors of mainstream American activities must operate in order to
accommodate people with newly-defined, COVID-19-related disabilities under
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The required
modifications will affect all patrons and employees of these establishments.
Under the ADA, places of public accommodation are barred from
discriminating against people with disabilities in the full and equal enjoyment
of goods, services, and facilities. Infectious diseases like tuberculosis and HIV
have been categorized as disabilities under the ADA, and COVID-19 is defining
new categories of individuals with disabilities (including individuals vulnerable
to COVID-19 complications) as revealed in this paper. Places of public
accommodation will be required to establish non-discriminatory methods to
identify “direct threats,” to modify policies and procedures for COVID-19related disability groups, identified here, and remove structural barriers that
discriminate against those same groups. Controversial measures like fever
checkpoints, mandatory face masking, and required social distancing are
discussed in depth and analyzed in light of the ADA’s requirements.

* M.D., J.D.; Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences and University of
Arkansas School of Law; See his related article, COVID-19 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Balancing Fear, Safety, and Risk as America Goes Back to Work, 51 Seton Hall Law Review
383-430 (2021).
251

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

252

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:251

INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 permanently changed the legal landscape for public
accommodations—like restaurants, retail stores, theaters, gyms, hospitals, and
many other private entities—under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) by adding novel new obligations of which covered entities must
be cognizant to avoid discrimination against people with newly definable
disabilities. 1 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) and researchers, COVID-19 is likely to become endemic to the United
States (“U.S.”) population, so these new legal obligations are unlikely to go
away for the foreseeable future. 2
“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities,” which created a “serious and pervasive social problem.” 3 The ADA
was enacted in 1990 to “remedy widespread discrimination against disabled
individuals” including “outright intentional exclusion as well as the failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices.” 4 The ADA was also
intended to integrate people with disabilities “into the economic and social
mainstream of American life”—including popular public accommodations like
restaurants, movie theaters, arenas, museums, and other public venues. 5
According to the Supreme Court, allowing discrimination based on the
contagiousness of a disease is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the ADA of
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
2. Ruiyun Li et al., Substantial Undocumented Infection Facilitates the Rapid Dissemination
of the Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), SCIENCE, Mar. 16, 2020, at 492 (noting that prior to
COVID-19 there were already “four endemic coronavirus strains circulating in human
populations,” and “[i]f the novel coronavirus follows the pattern of 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza,
it will also spread globally and become a fifth endemic coronavirus within the human population.”);
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, Third Edition: An Introduction to Applied
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section11.html [https://perma.cc/A78T-PVDR]
(Sept. 12, 2020) (defining “endemic” as the “constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease
or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area”);Virus Likely to Keep Coming Back
Each Year, Say Top Chinese Scientists, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Apr. 27, 2020, 10:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/virus-is-here-to-stay-and-likely-seasonalsay-china-scientists?utm_campaign=news&utm_medium=bd&utm_source=applenews
[https://perma.cc/3DLY-CHKZ] (noting that it is “unlikely the new virus will disappear” because
“it infects some people without causing obvious symptoms like fever,” creating a group of
“asymptomatic carriers” who can “spread the virus undetected,” and stating that this is “very likely
to be an epidemic that co-exists with humans for a long time”).
3. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674–75 (2001).
4. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
5. Id. at 675; see also Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2)) (stating that the ADA was adopted “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities,” and “to establish ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards’ for scrutinizing such
discrimination”).
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ensuring that people with disabilities are “not denied . . . benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.” 6 In finding that a person with
tuberculosis can be a protected person with a disability, the Court noted that
contagiousness gives rise to an unusually high level of “fear and
misapprehension” in society leading to “myths and fears about . . . disease [that]
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations” caused by the disease.7
Similarly, AIDS and even asymptomatic HIV infections have been found to be
protected disabilities under the ADA. 8
The endemic presence of COVID-19 creates several populations of
individuals that may face potential disability-related discrimination, including,
but not limited to (1) individuals hospitalized or severely ill with COVID-19;
(2) people with mild symptoms of COVID-19; (3) people who have tested
positive for COVID-19 but are asymptomatic; (4) individuals who have been
exposed to COVID-19; and (5) people who are vulnerable to COVID-19-related
morbidity or mortality due to other disabilities. In some situations, affected
individuals will be considered “direct threats,” not disabled, or otherwise not
covered by the ADA. But in other cases, the public accommodation will have to
make reasonable modifications to their practices, policies, procedures, or
structural barriers to avoid discrimination as defined by the ADA.
This paper explores disability and discrimination under the ADA with
regard to customers and clients of public accommodations, along with new
obligations for reasonable modifications (including controversial measures like
fever checkpoints, mandatory masking, and social distancing requirements) to
accommodate this evolving group of newly defined individuals and to avoid
COVID-19-related discriminatory practices.
I. WHO MUST COMPLY, WHAT IS PROHIBITED, AND WHO IS PROTECTED UNDER
TITLE III OF THE ADA?
Title III of the ADA applies to places of public accommodation (i.e.,
“covered entities”) and states the general rule that “[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
6. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (the Court here refers
to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which Congress has made clear applies to the ADA, which
adopted the Rehabilitation Act’s definitions).
7. Id.
8. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104, App. B (2010) (stating that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV
disease is an “impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,” and therefore included in
the definition of disability under this part, because of the actual effect on the individual with
symptomatic HIV disease or the reactions of other people to the individual with either symptomatic
or asymptomatic HIV disease cause such individual to be treated as though they are disabled.); see
also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a
disability under the ADA).
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any place of public accommodation.” 9 To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff must show that (1)
defendants own or operate a “place of public accommodation,” (2) defendants
discriminated against him “on the basis of his disability,” and (3) he has a
“disability.” 10
A.

Places of Public Accommodations

“Places of public accommodation” or “covered entities” under Title III of
the ADA generally include private entities affecting commerce included in any
of twelve categories including: (1) places of lodging, (2) establishments serving
food or drink, (3) places of exhibition or entertainment, (4) places of public
gathering, (5) sales or rental establishments, (6) service establishments, (7)
specified places of public transportation, (8) places of public display or
collection, (9) places of recreation, (10) private places of education, (11) social
service centers, and (12) places of exercise or recreation. 11
These twelve categories are “construed liberally to afford people with
disabilities equal access to the wide variety of establishments available to the
nondisabled.” 12 More specifically, public accommodations include many
important mainstream American businesses and industries that accommodate
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
10. Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F.Supp.2d 324, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(emphasis added) (“In order to establish a prima facie case” under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff
must “establish that: (a) he has a ‘disability’; (b) Defendants are owners or operators of a place of
‘public accommodation’; and (c) Defendants discriminated against him, on the basis of his
disability.”).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12181. The twelve categories of public accommodations include:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually
occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor; (B) a
restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a motion picture house,
theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment; (D) an
auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering; (E) a bakery,
grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental
establishment; (F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment; (G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation; (H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; (J) a nursery, elementary,
secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (K)
a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or
other social service center establishment; and (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley,
golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.
Id.
12. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676–77 (2001) (finding that “golf tours” were
places of public accommodation).
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countless customers and clients annually like hotels, restaurants, bars, movie
theaters, sports stadiums, convention centers, grocery stores, shopping centers,
beauty shops, professional offices (like doctors’ and lawyers’ offices), hospitals,
public transportation stations, museums, libraries, zoos, amusement parks,
private schools, day cares, food banks, gyms, and golf courses—just to name a
few. 13
B.

Discrimination

Title III of the ADA “provides that [n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.” 14 Title III divides prohibited behavior defined as
discrimination into three COVID-19-related categories. 15
First, discrimination includes “the imposition or application of eligibility
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability . . .
from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be
necessary.” 16 A few examples discussed below of possible eligibility criteria
relevant to COVID-19 discrimination analysis include denying entry to
individuals based upon criteria related to COVID-19 (e.g., positive tests, other
disabilities, symptoms) or requiring some type of documentation to allow entry
(e.g., certificates of health, COVID-19 passports) or rationing advanced health
services like mechanical ventilation to people with pre-existing disabilities or
with low quality of life scores.
Second, discrimination includes “a failure to make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary . . .,
unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of [the business].” 17 Some examples of COVID19-related potential “reasonable modifications” of policies, practices, or
procedures discussed below include alteration in operating hours, cleaning
procedures, employee testing, restriction of visitors to hospitals and nursing
homes, and requiring face masks, among others.
Third, discrimination includes “a failure to remove [structural]
architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable” or “where
. . . the removal of a barrier . . . is not readily achievable, a failure to [use] . . .

13. 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
14. Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2). Note that causation (i.e., “on the basis of disability”) is required in
the definition of discrimination. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.” 18 Structural
barriers related to COVID-19 may include lack of barriers between employees
and customers in checkout lines or other places where a prolonged encounter is
possible, requiring entry (e.g., failing to provide curbside checkout), and
requiring entry through turnstiles or door handles where contamination is
possible, among others.
Further, places of public accommodation have an affirmative duty to
provide goods and services to people with disabilities in “the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual” and should not deny
individuals with disabilities “the opportunity to participate in such programs or
activities that are not separate or different.” 19 In addition, associational
discriminatory behavior includes excluding or otherwise denying opportunities
to “an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association”—
for example, someone who has been exposed to a COVID-19 patient. 20
C. Disability
The ADA defines “disability” with respect to an individual as (1) “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of such individual,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” or (3) “being regarded
as having such an impairment.” 21 To be considered as an individual with a
disability under the ADA, at least one of these three “prongs”—referred to as
the (1) “actual impairment prong,” (2) “record of prong,” or (3) “regarded as
prong,” respectively—must be fulfilled. 22 The statute specifically states that the
definition of disability, including the individual terms, “shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of
this chapter.” 23
Under the first two prongs, the terms “substantially limit” and “major life
activity” must be fulfilled. The term “substantially limits” is not specifically
defined, but Congress emphasized in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (after
a series of court misinterpretations) 24 that “substantially limits” is to be
“construed in favor of broad coverage”—like the rest of the statutory definition
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (“Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of the individual.”).
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (emphasis added).
22. Id. (stating that, as denoted by the “or” connector in the definition, an individual must only
satisfy one prong to qualify as person with a “disability”).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (emphasis added).
24. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008).
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of “disability.” 25 Congress emphasized that “the primary object of attention”
should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations, and the
question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA
“should not demand extensive analysis.” 26 The regulations indicate that “[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active.” 27
The statute includes a nonexclusive list of “major life activities” that could
be limited by an impairment. 28 Severe cases of COVID-19 most commonly
affect the “major life activity” of “breathing,” but COVID-19 may also limit
other major life activities like “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . .
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 29 A
nonexclusive list of “major bodily functions” is also included in the definition
of “major life activities.” 30 COVID-19 most commonly affects the major bodily
function of the respiratory system, but also could affect the other listed systems,
“including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, . . . digestive,
bowel, . . . [and] circulatory . . . functions.” 31 Importantly, an individual
vulnerable to COVID-19 complications or death may also have a “disability”
defined by these terms, and therefore, be covered by the ADA.
The “regarded as” prong does not require the individual to establish a
substantial limitation of any major life activities. 32 Instead,
[a]n individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity. 33

The “regarded as” prong is Congress’ way of “acknowledg[ing] that society’s
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” 34 Specifically for the

25. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008).
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Wei-jie Guan et al., Clinical Characteristics of Coronavirus
Disease 2019 in China, 382 THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1708, 1716 (Table 3)(2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2002032 [https://perma.cc/QY6M-U3LL].
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
30. Id.
31. Id.; Wei-jie Guan et al., Clinical Characteristics of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in China,
382 THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1708, 1716 (Table 3)(2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full
/10.1056/NEJMoa2002032 [https://perma.cc/QY6M-U3LL].
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
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“regarded as” prong, the statute includes a “transitory and minor” exception for
the “regarded as” prong stating it “shall not apply to impairments that are
transitory and minor.” 35
II. EVOLVING ADA DEFINITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO
COVID-19
COVID-19-related considerations are used here to divide the population into
COVID-19-related groups and to evaluate accommodation and discrimination
avoidance requirements based on COVID-19 status.
A.

COVID-19-Related Disability Grouping of the Population

Disabled “clients or customers” of public accommodations are protected by
Title III of the ADA. 36 To facilitate a discussion of the ADA’s COVID-19related requirements, these clients and customers can be divided into groups
related to their COVID-19 status. For purposes of evaluation, this paper
examines the following groups: (1) COVID-19 contagious or potentially
contagious individuals, (2) COVID-19 survivors with negative tests, (3)
otherwise disabled individuals at high risk for COVID-19 complications if they
become infected, and (4) healthy, non-disabled individuals who are
asymptomatic. 37
1.

COVID-19 Contagious or Potentially Contagious Individuals

Similar to individuals with other communicable diseases (e.g., HIV,
tuberculosis), individuals with active, confirmed COVID-19 and those
potentially contagious (e.g., people with symptoms or with known exposure to
COVID-19) will require an individualized assessment under the ADA to
determine whether they qualify for disability protection. 38 Here, the following
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also Frank Griffin, COVID-19 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Balancing Fear, Safety, and Risk as America Goes Back to Work, 51 SETON HALL L. REV.
383, 420-22 (discussing ADA obligations to employees—including those of public
accommodations—under Title I of the ADA).
37. Harvey Fineberg, Ten Weeks to Crush the Curve, 382 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. e37 (2020)
(providing an example of population grouping based upon COVID-19 status by differentiating
everyone into five groups for health purposes including people with: (1) active COVID-19
infections, (2) signs and symptoms of COVID-19 and therefore, presumptively infected, but with
negative tests (the tests have high numbers of false negatives) (source: white house test), (3) known
exposure to COVID-19, (4) no history of COVID-19 exposure or infection, and (5) recovery from
COVID-19 and possibly immune).
38. 28 C.F.R. §36.208; Reducing Stigma, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(June 11, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/reducingstigma.html [https://perma.cc/D6D6-9DD4] (hereinafter CDC Stigma) (warning that
communicable diseases, like COVID-19, often expose society’s greatest myths, fears, and negative
reactions leading to “[s]tigmatization,” which is “especially common in disease outbreaks” and
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subgroups of potentially COVID-19 contagious individuals will be considered:
(1) individuals with severe confirmed COVID-19, (2) individuals with mild or
asymptomatic cases of COVID-19 and those only exposed to COVID-19 or
feared to have COVID-19 based on symptoms, and (3) travelers to COVID-19
“hotspots.” In addition, the concept of a “direct threat” in the context of these
groups will be explored, along with its implications on the disability rights under
the ADA.
First, approximately 19% of COVID-19 patients in one study of 70,000
Chinese patients were classified as severe (14%) or critical (5%). 39 Individuals
with severe or critical cases of COVID-19 requiring hospitalization or
significant medical care qualify as individuals with a disability under the “actual
impairment” prong while they are severely ill because during that time they have
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 40 Major life activities often limited in severe cases of COVID-19
include “breathing” and the “respiratory system” demonstrated by symptoms
including labored breathing, severe coughing, pneumonia, and sometimes even
respiratory failure requiring invasive mechanical ventilation. 41 Other major
bodily functions under the ADA are also frequently substantially limited in
severe COVID-19 cases including the immune system (e.g., 83.2% incidence of
lymphocytopenia in one study), digestive system, and circulatory system, among
others, that can all substantially limit major life activities like “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, . . . eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working” due to issues like severe fatigue, malaise, fever,
muscle pain, and other COVID-19 symptoms. 42 For example, in Arline, the
Supreme Court found that the teacher’s tuberculosis “affect[ed] her respiratory
system” during her hospitalization, and therefore, “Arline thus had a physical
impairment . . . affecting her respiratory system . . . serious enough to require
hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her
major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment.” 43 A similar
analysis will result for most COVID-19 patients with severe COVID-19 during
hospitalization or acute medical care, even if they are only severely ill for
results in “stigmatized groups [being] subjected to social avoidance or rejection,” among other
things).
39. Zunyou Wu & Jennifer McGoogan, Characteristics of and Important Lessons From the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of a Report of 72 314 Cases
From the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 323 JAMA NETWORK 1239 (2020).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
41. Wu et al., supra note 39, at 1239 (reporting respiratory symptoms including coughing,
pneumonia, dyspnea, and respiratory failure).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Guan et al., supra note 31, at 1713 (Table 1).
43. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (emphasis added); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1996).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

260

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:251

relatively short periods of time because duration is “only one factor” used in the
assessment. 44
Second, approximately 81% of individuals with COVID-19 infections in a
study of 70,000 Chinese cases were mild and ranged from having no symptoms
at all (i.e., asymptomatic) to having mild pneumonia or symptoms similar to the
common cold. 45 Individuals with mild or asymptomatic COVID-19 and those
who have only been exposed to COVID-19 will not qualify as an individual with
a disability under the “actual impairment” or “record of” prongs of the ADA
because they have no physical impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity—similar to other mild injuries and diseases considered by courts. For
example, “a record of recovery from a minor laceration or the common cold
would not qualify for coverage under this definition.” 46 Likewise, broken bones
and badly sprained joints typically heal in 6-12 weeks, but courts find them
insufficient to qualify as an actual disability under the ADA. 47 Similarly, short
term or intermittent low back pain treated with over-the-counter medications
often fails to qualify as a disability with one court explaining that a “temporary
non-chronic impairment of short duration is not a disability covered by the
[ADA].” 48
However, an individual with mild or asymptomatic COVID-19 or who has
only been exposed to COVID-19 might qualify as an individual with a disability
(assuming they are not “direct threats”—see discussion below) under the
44. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16, 978, 16,982 (Mar. 25, 2011) (citing Joint HoyerSensenbrenner Statement on the Origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 2008, H.R. 3195 at 6)
(explaining that the duration of the impairment is “only one factor in determining whether the
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and impairments that last only a short period
of time may be covered if sufficiently severe.”).
45. Wu et al., supra note 39, at 1239 (“Most cases were classified as mild (81%; i.e., nonpneumonia and mild pneumonia).”).
46. Karl Menninger, Proof of “Disability” Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 33 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 § 10 (Mar. 2020 update) (Originally published in 1995); see, e.g.,
Corning v. LodgeNet Interactive Corp., 896 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1144, 1148 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (finding
that an individual could not establish a record of a disability without showing substantial limits of
a major life activity and record of his FMLA leave and his supervisor’s knowledge of his kidney
failure and chronic heart failure did not provide record of disability); Jenkins-Allen v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that seven months of
workers’ compensation leave for surgery on both hands for carpal tunnel syndrome alone did not
provide a record of disability); Maldonado v. Cooperativa De Ahorro, 685 F.Supp.2d 264, 274
(D.P.R. 2010) (explaining that a record of sleep apnea was not a record of impairment where it did
not limit any major life activity).
47. See, e.g., Kruger v. Hamilton Manor Nursing Home, 10 F.Supp.3d 385, 390 (W.D.N.Y.
2014) (holding a temporary broken arm was insufficient for finding a disability); see also Spath v.
Berry Plastics Corp., 900 F.Supp 893, 903 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that a broken ankle requires
a further determination of facts to qualify as a disability).
48. Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012).
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“regarded as” prong due to the associated stigma of COVID-19, depending upon
how courts ultimately view COVID-19 under the “transitory and minor”
exception to this prong. Under the “regarded as” prong, the individual must only
establish “that he or she has been subjected to [a discriminatory
action]. . .because of [a] . . . perceived physical . . . impairment.” 49 The
“regarded as” prong covers impairments that “might not diminish a person’s
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit the
person’s ability to work [or participate in public accommodations] as a result of
the negative reactions of others to the impairment.” 50 For example, Arline
involved a school teacher with a history of tuberculosis, an infectious disease,
who was “regarded as” having a disability by her school district because of her
employer’s unfounded fears. 51
The “transitory and minor” exception included in the “regarded as” prong
states that the “regarded as” prong “shall not apply to impairments that are
transitory and minor.” 52 A transitory impairment is defined in the statute as “an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 53 COVID19 has a median recovery time for individuals with mild cases of only 2 weeks. 54
So, the outcome of the individualized assessments will likely depend upon
whether courts view COVID-19 as “minor.” “Minor” is not defined in the
statute. For employment cases, the regulations state that the “transitory and
minor exception” “should be construed narrowly.” 55
Swine flu was tested in the courts under the transitory and minor exception,
where a Minnesota court found swine flu to be “minor,” leaving the employee
unprotected by the ADA when he was fired at the “height of . . . public hysteria”
of the swine flu panic in 2009 because the employer mistakenly “feared [the
employee] had contracted swine flu” while traveling to attend his sister’s
funeral. 56 The Minnesota court ruled that whether an impairment is “transitory
and minor” is determined objectively (i.e., “what matters is whether the
impairment is, in fact, transitory and minor”) and is not based upon what the
defendant believed at the time. 57 The court compared swine flu morbidity and
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282–84 (1987).
Id. at 273.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
Id.
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/corona
viruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf#:~:text=Using%20available%20pre
liminary%20data%2C,severe%20or%20critical%20disease [https://perma.cc/AFN4-FVLC]
(hereinafter WHO Joint Mission).
55. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(k), (l) (2019).
56. Valdez v. Minnesota Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801 PJS/TNL, 2012 WL 6112846, at *2‒
3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012).
57. Id. at *2 (emphasis in original) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2019)).
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mortality numbers to those of the seasonal flu to determine whether it qualified
as “transitory and minor” because the “seasonal flu is undoubtedly ‘transitory
and minor’ for purposes of the ADA.” 58
In performing the comparison of swine flu to seasonal influenza, the court
considered the fact that there were a “total of 274,000 hospitalizations and
12,470 deaths in the United States due to swine flu from April 2009 to April
2010” compared to the CDC estimate of over 200,000 hospitalizations and up to
49,000 deaths annually from the seasonal flu in the United States. 59 Because the
swine flu did not objectively result in considerably more hospitalizations and
deaths than the seasonal flu, and because the seasonal flu is not to be considered
a disability based on the ADA’s legislative history, the court concluded that
“from an objective standpoint, swine flu must be considered transitory and
minor.” 60 Therefore, because the swine flu could not be considered a disability
under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition, the court found
that the fired worker was not protected by the ADA. 61
If other courts follow the Minnesota court’s logic, the outcome of the
“regarded as” analysis for individuals with mild or asymptomatic COVID-19
cases and those who have been exposed to COVID-19 may depend upon how
the “final” COVID-19 morbidity and mortality numbers compare to those of
seasonal influenza. 62 Nevertheless, comparisons of COVID-19 to seasonal
influenza is not a valid comparison. 63
By May 2020, “approximately 65,000 people in the U.S. had died of
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),” which is deceptively “similar to the
estimated number of seasonal influenza deaths reported annually by the CDC.” 64
However, “[t]his apparent equivalence of deaths from COVID-19 and seasonal
influenza does not match front-line clinical conditions, especially in some hot
zones of the pandemic where ventilators have been in short supply, and many

58. Id. at *3.
59. Id.
60. Id. (relying on the fact that the swine flu “has a mortality and hospitalization profile similar
to that of seasonal flu, and the legislative history cites seasonal flu as the paradigmatic example of
a transitory and minor ailment.”).
61. Valdez v. Minnesota Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801 PJS/TNL, 2012 WL 6112846,, at
*3–4 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (2012). Individuals who have been exposed may also be
protected against associational discriminatory behavior including excluding or otherwise denying
opportunities to “an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom
the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.” Id. However, this analysis
is wrapped into the “direct threat” analysis below. See infra text accompanying notes 85–92.
63. Jeremy Samuel Faust & Carlos del Rio, Assessment of Deaths from COVID-19 and from
Seasonal Influenza, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1045, 1045 (May 14, 2020), https://jamanetwork
.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2766121 [https://perma.cc/8MBT-SFSP].
64. Id.
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hospitals have been stretched beyond their limits.” 65 The “demand on hospital
resources during the COVID-19 crisis has not occurred before in the U.S., even
during the worst of influenza seasons.” 66 The “root of such incorrect
comparisons may be a knowledge gap” related to how the data is reported, and
point out that seasonal influenza morbidity and mortality are estimates based on
hospital codes, but COVID-19 numbers are based on “raw counts.” 67 In other
words, “COVID-19 fatalities are at present being counted and reported directly,
not estimated,” like seasonal influenza numbers. 68
Instead of an annual comparison of deaths, researchers suggest that weekly
comparisons between COVID-19 and seasonal influenza deaths are more valid.
COVID-19 deaths during two weeks in April were 15,455 and 14,478 compared
to the peak week of influenza seasons from 2013 to 2020 when deaths ranged
from 351 in 2016 to 1626 in 2018, and the mean was 752. 69 “These statistics on
counted deaths suggest that the number of COVID-19 deaths” during a possible
peak week in 2020 were “9.5-fold to 44.1-fold greater than the peak week of
counted influenza deaths during the past [seven] influenza seasons in the U.S.,
with a 20.5-fold mean increase.” 70 The reported deaths for the week ending April
11, 2020, were “14.4-fold greater than influenza deaths during the apparent peak
week of the current [2020 flu] season.” 71
COVID-19 deaths “may be undercounted owing to ongoing limitations of
test capacity or false-negative test results.” 72 However, “influenza counts may
[still] be less reliable because adult influenza deaths are not reportable to public
health authorities, as are the case for COVID-19 deaths.” 73 Further, some cities,
“such as New York City,” may include “some deaths that have been labeled as
having been caused by COVID-19 [but] are not due to COVID-19.” 74
In addition, “[c]ase fatality rates are another topic of confusion” because the
comparison of COVID-19 and influenza is premature. 75 In May 2020,
“[e]stimates of case fatality rates for COVID-19 ranged from less than 1% in
some nations to approximately 15% in others” with the wide range reflecting
“limitations in calculating case fatality rates” including testing differences and
incomplete follow-up. 76

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1045.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1045.
Id.
Id.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

264

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:251

The CDC’s best estimate in late May 2020 is a case fatality rate of 0.4%,
which is more in line with the researchers’ predictions in the above study when
looking at a cruise ship. 77 The researchers in the above study note that the
Diamond Princess cruise ship is “one of the few situations for which complete
data are available.” Although the outbreak on that ship resulted in a case fatality
rate of 1.8% (13 deaths of 712 cases), an “age adjusted” figure that reflects the
age of the general population is “closer to 0.5%.” 78 However, “0.5% would still
be 5 times the commonly cited case fatality rate of adult seasonal influenza.” 79
The researchers conclude that “[a]lthough officials may say that SARS-CoV-2
is ‘just another flu,’ this is not true,” 80 but how courts ultimately interpret the
data is hard to predict. Courts could possibly find that individuals with mild
cases, asymptomatic cases, and those who have only been exposed to COVID19 are entitled to ADA protections under the “regarded as” prong if COVID-19
is not considered “transitory and minor.” However, these individuals could still
be disqualified for ADA protection under the “direct threat” exception discussed
below.
Third, travelers to COVID-19 “hotspots” and high-risk areas are not covered
by the ADA based on a 2019 Eleventh Circuit decision where the court declined
to “expand the regarded as disabled definition in the ADA to cover cases . . . in
which an employer perceives an employee to be presently healthy with only the
potential to become disabled in the future due to voluntary conduct.” 81
Presumably, similar logic would apply to a public accommodation who refused
goods or services to an otherwise healthy recent traveler to a COVID-19 highrisk area without intervening quarantine time because the traveler would not
qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA based on travel risk
alone.
Finally, even if an individual has a disability defined by the ADA, public
accommodations can defend discriminatory actions if the individual poses a
“direct threat” to himself or others—as is sometimes the case for infectious
diseases. Under Title III, covered entities are not required “to permit an
individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,

77. COVID-19 Pandemic Planning Scenarios, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (July 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planningscenarios-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKL8-S59J] (hereinafter CDC Pandemic Planning); Arman
Azad, CDC Estimates that 35% of Coronavirus Patients Don’t Have Symptoms, CNN HEALTH
(May 22, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/health/cdc-coronavirus-estimates-symptomsdeaths/index.html [https://perma.cc/VE7Z-HQ3N].
78. Faust, supra note 63, at 1046; see also Guan et al., supra note 31, at 1708 (finding a case
fatality rate of 1.4%).
79. Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1046.
80. Id.
81. EEOC v. STME, LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1213 (M.D. Fla. 2018), aff’d, 938 F.3d 1305,
1311 (11th Cir. 2019).
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privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such
individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” 82 “Direct
threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services.” 83 The ADA’s definition of “direct
threat” is a codification of the Supreme Court’s articulated standard while
holding that a person with a contagious disease, tuberculosis, can be a person
with a disability under the law. 84
Public accommodations cannot make generalized stereotypical assumptions
regarding contagious diseases and “direct threats.” The Supreme Court
explained, “[t]he fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose
a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify
excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived
contagious diseases.” 85 The Court observed, “[s]uch exclusion would mean that
those accused of being contagious would never have the opportunity to have
their condition evaluated in light of medical evidence . . . . [r]ather, they would
be vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of mythology—precisely the type
of injury Congress sought to prevent.” 86 Paradoxically, the EEOC has done
exactly that in one of its statements online, as discussed below.
To determine whether a particular individual poses a direct threat, public
accommodations must make:
an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on
current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to
ascertain: (1) the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (2) the probability
that the potential injury will actually occur; and (3) whether reasonable
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk. 87

Without an individualized assessment of these factors, any overly generalized
policy based on COVID-19 stereotypes or generalizations will likely be found
unlawful. 88 Preferred sources for “current medical knowledge” include “public
health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the CDC, and the
NIH.” 89
So, for people who are contagious or potentially contagious with COVID19, the risks of the disease itself can first be assessed. In addition, the
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
85. Id. at 285 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
88. See id. (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 273).
89. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648, 650 (1998) (“In assessing the reasonableness of
petitioner’s actions, the views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service,
CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority.”).
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characteristic of the specific public accommodation will be considered—such as
potential for distancing, likelihood of contact with other patrons, etc.
For COVID-19, research continues to emerge and evolve. The first factor
includes the nature, duration, and severity of the risk. 90 The nature of the risk for
COVID-19 spread is primarily person-to-person contact. The CDC says the
virus is spread “[b]etween people who are in close contact with one another
(within about 6 feet)” “[t]hrough respiratory droplets produced when an infected
person coughs, sneezes or talks.” 91 Researchers note that a “key factor in the
transmissibility of COVID-19 is the high level of SARS-CoV-2 shedding in the
upper respiratory tract, even among pre-symptomatic patients.” 92 With regard to
duration, researchers note that “public health authorities define a significant
exposure to COVID-19 as face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with
symptomatic COVID-19 that is sustained for at least a few minutes (and some
say more than 10 minutes or even 30 minutes)” and that the “chance of catching
COVID-19 from a passing interaction in a public space is therefore minimal.” 93
The severity of the risk, however, could be considered to be high because
severe illness and death can result from infection. Arline’s language infers that
“the significance of a risk is a product of the odds that transmission will occur
and the severity of the consequences.” 94 As noted above, in one of the few
available situations with complete data, the case fatality rate aboard the Diamond
Princess cruise ship was 1.8%, with an estimated age-adjusted general
population risk of 0.5% of death associated with COVID-19 infection, which
means that around one in 200 people who get a COVID-19 infection will die. 95
As noted above, the CDC’s best estimate is a 0.4% case fatality rate. 96 This is
four to five times the risk associated with seasonal influenza.97 Since death is
permanent, an argument can be made that the duration of the risk is permanent
90. Arline, 480 U.S. at 273.
91. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, How COVID-19 Spreads (June 16,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html
?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fprepare
%2Ftransmission.html [https://perma.cc/2RJ4-SQ3B] (hereinafter CDC How COVID-19 Spreads).
92. Monica Gandhi et al., Asymptomatic Transmission, the Achilles’ Heel of Current
Strategies to Control COVID-19, 382 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2158, 2158 (May 28, 2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2009758?query=recirc_curatedRelated_article?
query=C19&cid=DM90829_NEJM_COVID-19_Newsletter&bid=188147264 [https://perma.cc/3
LGU-ZWN9] (emphasis added).
93. Michael Klompas et al., Universal Masking in Hospitals in the COVID-19 Era, 382 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 63 (May 21, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2006372
?query=TOC [https://perma.cc/BUJ2-AYFE].
94. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is the potential gravity of
the harm that imbues certain odds of an event with significance.”).
95. Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1046.
96. Azad, supra note 77; CDC Pandemic Planning, supra note 77.
97. Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1046.
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when viewed in this context. The Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that “when
the adverse event is the contraction of a fatal disease, the risk of transmission
can be significant even if the probability of transmission is low: death itself
makes the risk ‘significant.’” 98
The second factor in evaluating a direct threat is the “probability that the
potential injury will actually occur,” which relates to the contagiousness of
COVID-19. 99 As noted above, the Diamond Princess cruise ship was one of the
few contained situations where complete data was available. Onboard that cruise
ship were 3,711 people, 100 and 712 were COVID-19 positive, 101 which means
that roughly 19% became infected in the contained cruise ship environment over
a few weeks. So, for cruise ships, the probability of infection is likely around
19%. Since only 3.4% of those infected will be hospitalized, the probability of
hospitalization on a cruise ship is less than 0.7%. 102 The CDC estimates the
general populations’ overall case fatality risk to be 0.4% for those infected with
COVID-19, which means that the risk of COVID-19 death for the general
population being on a cruise ship with a COVID-19 outbreak is less than
0.08%. 103 These risks may be even lower if new modifications to safety
protocols are implemented once cruise ships resume business after the pandemic
has abated.
A cruise ship is a contained environment for a prolonged period of time with
the same group of people, unlike most encounters in other places of public
accommodation; so, the probability would likely be much lower in most other
places of public accommodation. In addition, with COVID-19 precautions and
screening in place, the probabilities are likely to be significantly altered even on
a cruise ship today. Overall, the probability that COVID-19 transmission will
occur in a specific place of public accommodation depends upon issues like
social distancing, close prolonged contact, location (outside versus inside), and
the characteristics of the population (e.g., age, comorbidities).
The third factor in the direct threat analysis is “whether reasonable
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.” 104 The
CDC recommends avoiding exposure to the virus and taking steps to slow the
spread, including maintaining “good social distance (about 6 feet),” frequent
98. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1297.
99. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
100. Tina Saey, Cruise Ship Outbreak Helps Pin Down How Deadly the New Coronavirus Is,
SCIENCENEWS (March 12, 2020), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-outbreak-dia
mond-princess-cruise-ship-death-rate [https://perma.cc/74VP-8TZ8] (noting 3,711 people were
aboard the Diamond Princess).
101. Faust & del Rio, supra note 63, at 1046 (noting 712 positive COVID-19 cases on the
Diamond Princess).
102. 19% x 0.034 = 0.00646 (6.46%).
103. 19% infected x 0.4% chance of dying = 0.076%.
104. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345.
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hand washing, and regularly disinfecting surfaces. 105 As discussed in detail
below, an analysis of reasonable modifications to mitigate direct threats are
specific to the public accommodation and an individualized assessment. If the
risk can be mitigated by reasonable modifications, then an individual would no
longer be considered a “direct threat” under the ADA.
In summary, the direct threat analysis will be case—and individual—
specific. In some venues, the analysis will be completely different from others.
For example, in places where particularly vulnerable people gather—like
nursing homes—the analysis will be completely different than places where
mostly young people congregate—like playgrounds. Given some of the
controversies over this pandemic, courts may even come to different conclusions
under similar scenarios—so outcomes of early individual cases may be difficult
to predict.
For example, HIV infection has resulted in variability in court opinions. “On
one hand, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have implicitly followed a
cautious rule,” whereas the First Circuit ruled that “not only must the danger be
theoretically justifiable, it must also have been realized in at least several
cases.” 106 In the “cautious circuits” even small risks of HIV infection are
significant where:
a showing of a specific and theoretically sound means of possible transmission
was enough to justify summary judgment against an HIV-positive plaintiff on
the ground that the infection posed a “significant risk” to others in the workplace,
even though reported incidents of transmission were few or nonexistent, and the
odds of transmission were admittedly small. 107

In contrast, the First Circuit noted that a dentist “is not entitled to demand
absolute safety” in dealing with HIV positive patients and that “‘remote
theoretical possibility’ of HIV transmission through tears, saliva, and urine”
were not significant risks. 108 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that “[i]t was an
error to require that every theoretical possibility of harm be disproved.” 109
Courts may have similar difficulties discerning a consistent, clear path in early
cases involving COVID-19.
2.

COVID-19 Survivors With Negative Tests

COVID-19 survivors’ ADA status changes after recovery from active
infection from a medical and legal standpoint. From a medical standpoint, they
are no longer shedding the virus, so they are not contagious and, therefore, are

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

CDC How COVID-19 Spreads, supra note 91.
Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297–98, (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298 (quoting Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Id. (quoting Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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not a direct threat. 110 In addition, they may possibly be immune to COVID-19
because the infection produces antibodies to COVID-19 that may be
protective. 111 From a legal standpoint, the analysis also changes.
First, previously hospitalized and severely ill COVID-19 survivors will
continue to qualify as individuals with disabilities under the “record of” prong
of the ADA. People surviving severe or critical cases of COVID-19 requiring
hospitalization typically recover within three to six weeks.112 An individual who
has fully recovered from COVID-19 and is no longer positive for the virus no
longer qualifies as an individual with a disability under the “actual impairment”
prong for their COVID-19 infection because they no longer have a physical
impairment (unless they acquired a new disability during the infection).
However, the “record of” prong ensures that “people are not discriminated
against because of a history of disability.” 113 For example, the U.S. military is
considering excluding all applicants with a history of COVID-19. 114 Public
accommodations could face scrutiny under the ADA for any similar policy. To
qualify under the “record of” prong, a record that might be used to demonstrate
disability could include education, medical, or employment records, among
others. 115 For example, the Supreme Court found that a teacher’s
“hospitalization for tuberculosis . . . suffices to establish that she has a ‘record

110. When Can You Be Around Others After You Had or Likely Had COVID-19, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (May 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus
/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/end-home-isolation.html [https://perma.cc/W4JR-HRWK] (stating that
it is safe for a person with known COVID-19 to be around others when they have been afebrile for
three days, symptoms have improved, and it has been 10 days since symptoms first appeared); see
also Fei Zhou et al., Clinical Course and Risk Factors for Mortality of Adult Inpatients with
COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: a Retrospective Cohort Study, 395 LANCET 1054, 1054 (March 9,
2020), https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(20)30566-3.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/DZ4U-MW57] (stating that the “[m]edian duration of viral shedding was 20·0 days (IQR
17·0–24·0) in survivors, but SARS-CoV-2 was detectable until death in non-survivors. The longest
observed duration of viral shedding in survivors was 37 days.”).
111. Robert Kirkcaldy et al., COVID-19 and Post-Infection Immunity, 323 JAMA Online 2246
(May 11, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2766097 [https://perma.cc/FF
6V-VLXR] (stating “[i]n summary, existing limited data on antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2
and related coronaviruses, as well as one small animal model study, suggest that recovery from
COVID-19 might confer immunity against reinfection, at least temporarily.”).
112. WHO Joint Mission, supra note 54 (Reporting that, “[u]sing available preliminary data,
the median time from onset to clinical recovery for mild cases is approximately 2 weeks and is 3-6
weeks for patients with severe or critical disease.”).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2019).
114. Meghann Myers, Coronavirus Survivors Banned from Joining Military, MILITARY TIMES
(May 6, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/06/coronavirus-sur
vivors-banned-from-joining-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/QR88-EDD2] (circulating a memo
from the Pentagon stating that “a history of COVID-19, confirmed by either a laboratory test or
clinician diagnosis, is permanently disqualifying.”).
115. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276.
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of . . . impairment’ . . . and is therefore a handicapped individual.” 116 Therefore,
COVID-19 survivors who were hospitalized or otherwise received significant
medical care with serious or critical illnesses can likely qualify for ADA
protection under the “record of” a disability prong, since at the time of their
hospitalization, COVID-19 substantially limited major life activities.
Second, survivors of mild COVID-19 cases, asymptomatic COVID-19
cases, and COVID-19 exposure cases could possibly be protected under the
“regarded as” prong if public accommodations discriminate against them based
on their prior COVID-19 history—as long as courts don’t determine that
COVID-19 is subject to the “transitory and minor” exception discussed above.
The “regarded as” prong helps fulfill the ADA’s goal of protecting people due
to the stigma that can “occur after a person has been released from COVID-19
quarantine even though they are not considered a risk for spreading the virus to
others.” 117
3.

Disabled Individuals at High Risk for COVID-19 Complications If
They Become Infected

Vulnerable individuals who are susceptible to COVID-19 complications,
including death, may represent a new class of individuals with disabilities under
Title III of the ADA because they cannot fully and equally enjoy the “goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations” of places of
public accommodation and therefore, they must disproportionately risk their
lives to participate in life. 118
According to the CDC, people who are at “high-risk for severe illness from
COVID-19” are people age “65 years and older [and p]eople living in a nursing
home or long-term care facility.” 119 Additionally, “people of all ages with
underlying medical conditions, particularly if not well controlled.” 120
“Underlying medical conditions” specifically mentioned by the CDC include
chronic lung disease, moderate to severe asthma, serious heart conditions,
immunocompromise caused by any health condition (such as “cancer treatment,
smoking, bone marrow or organ transplantation, immune deficiencies, poorly
controlled HIV or AIDS, and prolonged use of corticosteroids and other immune
weakening medications”), severe obesity (BMI>40), diabetes, chronic kidney
disease, and liver disease. 121 In a study of hospitalized patients in New York,
COVID-19 was found to be particularly dangerous to people with older age,
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 281.
CDC Stigma, supra note 38.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
Frequently asked questions: Higher risk, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (CDC), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/88316/cdc_88316_DS1.pdf? [https://perma
.cc/D59N-97RW] (Nov. 21, 2020) (emphasis added) (hereinafter CDC Higher Risk).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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hypertension, obesity, and diabetes. 122 In another study, the risk of death from
COVID-19 for hospitalized patients was markedly higher for patients with these
comorbidities than for younger, healthier patients. 123
The risk of COVID-19 infection to these vulnerable individuals
substantially limit major life activities such as “caring for oneself” by going to
the grocery store and other places of public accommodation due to the need to
practice social distancing and “working” (especially for individuals who work
in an environment that requires contact with the public). 124 Therefore, new
populations of high risk individuals may now be considered to be disabled under
the ADA because of the substantial limits placed upon their major life activities
by the presence and risks of COVID-19.
Specifically, for people at “higher risk of getting very sick from COVID19,” the CDC advises them to “stock up on supplies, take everyday precautions
to keep space between yourself and others, . . . keep away from others who are
sick [when you go out in public], limit close contact and wash your hands often,
[and] avoid crowds, cruise travel, and non-essential travel.” 125 Further, the CDC
says, “if there is an outbreak in your community, stay home as much as
possible.” 126 If followed, these CDC recommendations will substantially limit
the ability of vulnerable populations to participate in major life activities
involving public accommodations where crowds may gather or the risk of
COVID-19 exposure is significant. Therefore, many people previously not
considered to be disabled under the ADA may now be considered disabled due
to the restrictions related to their physical impairments that put them at high risk
of morbidity and mortality related to COVID-19.
The Second Circuit has found that individuals with special susceptibilities—
such as those vulnerable to COVID-19—are entitled to an individualized
assessment under the ADA. In Staron, customers susceptible to cigarette smoke
sought a total ban on smoking in McDonalds’ restaurants. 127 The Second Circuit
held that a “fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry” was required by the ADA to
determine whether this modification was necessary and that the smoke-sensitive
customers stated a triable cause of action for an ADA violation. 128 “Cases in
which individuals claim under the ADA that allergies to smoke constitute a
122. Safiya Richardson et al., Presenting Characteristics, Comorbidities, and Outcomes
Among 5700 Patients Hospitalized With COVID-19 in the New York City Area, 323(20) J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 2052, 2053 (2020) (reporting the most common comorbidities were hypertension
(56%), obesity (41.7%), and diabetes (33.8%)).
123. Zhou et al., supra note 110, at 1058 (noting older age and other comorbidities as significant
risk factors).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
125. CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119.
126. Id.
127. Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 353 (2d Cir. 1995).
128. Id.
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disability and require smoking restrictions are simply subject to the same general
reasonableness analysis as are other cases under the Act,” including “the same
case-by-case analysis that is applied to all other physical or mental
impairments.” 129 The Second Circuit noted, “[w]e see no reason why, under the
appropriate circumstances, a ban on smoking could not be a reasonable
modification.” 130
Some groups with special vulnerabilities—like significantly increased risk
of morbidity and mortality than the general population—to COVID-19 may be
analyzed differently now with regard to requests for modifications to public
accommodations to help protect them from COVID-19 infection. Under the
ADA, reasonable modifications are required for individuals who qualify as
having a disability either due to “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual” or due
to “a record of such an impairment.” 131 A few more controversial COVID-19
vulnerable groups will be considered here as examples.
First, diabetes has been considered a “disability” and/or “impairment”
meeting the ADA definition in some courts and not in others. For example, one
court found that under the ADA, “qualified individual with a disability” is
“defined broadly and includes diabetics.” 132 Similarly, the First Circuit found
that “[i]nsulin-dependent diabetes [is] a ‘physical impairment’ for purposes of
determining whether [a] plaintiff [is] disabled within [the] meaning of ADA.” 133
Likewise, ADA employment regulations state that “diabetes substantially limits
endocrine function” as one example of how diabetes “substantially limits,”
which implies that diabetes is a disability. 134 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found
that “[d]iabetes is a ‘physical impairment,’ which could qualify as a disability
under the ADA, because it affects the digestive, hemic and endocrine systems,
and eating is a major life activity.” 135 In contrast, other courts have found
diabetes, in itself, is not a disability. For example, one court found, “[d]iabetes
by itself does not constitute a ‘disability’ under [the ADA] unless it impairs an
individual’s ability to work or engage in other major life activities.” 136 Similarly,
another court found that an “employee’s diabetic condition did not substantially
limit his major life activity of eating and, thus, was not a disability under
ADA.” 137
129. Id. at 357.
130. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
132. Schreiner v. City of Gresham, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (D. Or. 2010) (emphasis added).
133. Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2010).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2019).
135. Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2009).
136. Diaz Rivera v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of P.R., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 244, 245 (D.P.R.
2009) (emphasis added).
137. Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
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Second, hypertension, at one time, was not considered a disability if
controlled on medications. 138 However, Congress subsequently modified the
statute such that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures such as . . . [anti-hypertensive] medication [and]
medical supplies.” 139 The Sixth Circuit found that “the activities affected by [a]
Plaintiff’s hypertension [can] constitute ‘major life activities’ because of their
significance in the human experience.” 140 People with diabetes and hypertension
may justifiably ‘substantially limit’ major life activities to comply with CDC
recommendations outlined above; therefore, under the ADA, these impairments
may be more likely to be classified as disabilities entitled to ADA protection in
the post-COVID-19 era. Under the same logic, many other comorbidities like
kidney disease, cancer, immunocompromise, etc. will also likely qualify as
disabilities under the actual disability prong where they substantially limit a
major life activity.
Third, and even more controversially, severe obesity (BMI > 40) might
arguably be classified as a disability related to COVID-19 risks. Typically,
physical characteristics such as “height, weight, and muscle tone” are not
considered “impairments” by courts unless they result from an “underlying
physiological disorder.” 141 For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]aken
as a whole, the relevant statutory and regulatory language makes it clear that for
obesity to qualify as a physical impairment—and thus a disability—under the
ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition.” 142
The Eighth Circuit concluded that “for obesity, even morbid obesity, to be
considered a physical impairment [under the ADA], it must result from an
underlying physiological disorder or condition.” 143 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
stated, “[w]e decline to extend ADA protection to all ‘abnormal’ (whatever that
term may mean) physical characteristics.” 144 For employment purposes, EEOC
guidance states that “weight is merely a physical characteristic—not a physical
impairment—unless it is both outside the normal range and the result of an

138. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E) (2012).
140. Williams v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs., 7 F. App’x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
141. Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[a]s with the
physical characteristics of height, weight, and muscle tone, ‘other conditions’ are not ‘impairments’
unless they are the result of an underlying physiological disorder.”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1112.
144. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To do so ‘would
make the central purpose of the statutes, to protect the disabled, incidental to the operation of the
“regarded as” prong, which would become a catch-all cause of action for discrimination based on
appearance, size, and any number of other things far removed from the reasons the statutes were
passed.’”).
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underlying physiological disorder.” 145 However, after COVID-19, an
individualized assessment, as required, might lead to a different outcome today.
Finally, another controversial argument is that advanced age could be
considered a disability given the COVID-19 risks based upon age alone
documented by the CDC and studies noted above. “Advanced age, in and of
itself, is . . . not [traditionally] an impairment” under the ADA, but “various
medical conditions commonly associated with age” can “constitute impairments
within the meaning” of the ADA’s disability definition. 146 However, the CDC
and medical studies cited above report age greater than sixty-five as being a
significant risk factor for COVID-19, which could substantially limit multiple
major life activities due to risks of infection. However, getting a court to
recognize age alone as an “impairment” may be challenging. One exception may
be elderly people who are nursing home residents who may qualify as
individuals with disabilities simply because their presence in a nursing home
portends substantial limitations in major life activities like “caring for oneself”
and other activities required to live independently without assistance—
regardless of age.
4.

Healthy, Non-Disabled Individuals Who Are Asymptomatic

People who have no comorbidities that could be defined as disabilities and
are having no symptoms of any illness are not covered under the ADA because
they have no impairment.

145. Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1112 (emphasis in original).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, (2019); see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Philadelphia Bd. of Elections, No. CIV.
A. 97-7085, 1998 WL 321253, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998) (“Being over the age of 65 is not in
and of itself an impairment, although medical conditions associated with age, such as osteoporosis,
can be. . . . The ADA requires reasonable modifications to accommodate only those actually
disabled, which may or may not include the elderly.”); Natarelli v. New York State Office of
Vocational & Educ. Servs. for Individuals With Disabilities, No. 607-CV-1130 GTS/GJD, 2009
WL 5204068, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Natarelli v. VESID Office, 420 F.
App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Advanced age, in and of itself, is not an impairment [for purposes of the
ADA].”); Lee v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Age
alone, however, is not a disability for purposes of the ADA. Although many octogenarians do suffer
from physical or mental impairments that limit one or more of their major life activities and are
therefore “individuals with disabilities” as defined by the ADA, others remain physically and
mentally healthy well into their ninth or tenth decade.”); Lee v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.,
418 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Age alone, however, is not a disability for purposes of
the ADA.”); Natarelli v. New York State Office of Vocational & Educ. Servs. for Individuals With
Disabilities, No. 607-CV-1130 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 5204068, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009),
aff’d sub nom. Natarelli v. VESID Office, 420 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (“the Court notes that
advanced age, in and of itself, is not a recognized “disability” for purposes of Title II of the ADA.”).
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COVID-19-Related Disability Accommodations and Avoidance of
Discrimination

As discussed above, individuals with disabilities who are susceptible to
COVID-19 complications, as well as people possibly contagious with COVID19 are likely to be protected individuals with disabilities by the ADA under some
circumstances. Potentially discriminatory practices against COVID-19-related
disability groups include implementation of eligibility criteria, failure to make
reasonable modifications, and failure to remove structural barriers to allow these
groups to fully and equally enjoy places of public accommodation. 147 People
with disabilities are guaranteed “more than mere access to public facilities”; they
are guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment,” not just what is “necessary.” 148
Specifically, “[p]ublic accommodations must start by considering how their
facilities are used by non-disabled guests and then take reasonable steps to
provide disabled guests with a like experience.” 149 For example, a movie theater
is required to provide companion seating for a person with a disability—not just
the wheelchair seat—to provide an equal opportunity to enjoy a movie with a
companion. 150
Public accommodations should consider enacting three types of changes to
deal with COVID-19-related disabilities under the ADA including (1)
addressing COVID-19-related “direct threats” in a non-discriminatory manner,
(2) making reasonable modifications to policies, practices, and procedures to
protect people with disabilities defined by COVID-19, and (3) removing
structural barriers impacting people with COVID-19-related disabilities.
1.

Addressing COVID-19-Related “Direct Threats” in a NonDiscriminatory Manner

Under Title III, covered entities are not required “to permit an individual to
participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others.” 151 The definition of an “individual
with a disability” excludes “an individual who has a currently contagious disease
or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.” 152 However, places of
public accommodation also have an affirmative duty to include people with
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012).
148. Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a) (2012).
149. Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1135.
150. Id. (The court also notes that movie theater wheelchair seating cannot simply be in
uncomfortable positions like the front row because this does not provide “full and equal
enjoyment”).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
152. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 1999).
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disabilities in the “most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individual.” 153 In addition, disability discrimination includes “the imposition or
application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying any goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such
criteria can be shown to be necessary.” 154
To identify and accommodate or deny access to individuals who pose direct
threats, public accommodations are likely to rely on COVID-19-related
eligibility criteria related to physical exam findings (e.g., fever checks with
thermometers and with infrared scanning, visual inspection for outward signs of
infection like coughing or sneezing) or related to medical inquiries (e.g.,
symptom inquiries, health attestation requirements, health “passports” or
certificates, vaccination records). Safety requirements “must be based on actual
risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about
individuals with disabilities”—so the science behind some of these criteria will
be briefly explored below. 155
Interestingly, in March 2020, the EEOC included the following statement
on its website:
Based on guidance of the CDC and public health authorities as of March 2020,
the COVID-19 pandemic meets the direct threat standard. The CDC and public
health authorities have acknowledged community spread of COVID-19 in the
United States and have issued precautions to slow the spread, such as significant
restrictions on public gatherings. In addition, numerous state and local
authorities have issued closure orders for businesses, entertainment and sport
venues, and schools in order to avoid bringing people together in close quarters
due to the risk of contagion. These facts manifestly support a finding that a
significant risk of substantial harm would be posed by having someone with
COVID-19, or symptoms of it, present in the workplace at the current time. At
such time as the CDC and state/local public health authorities revise their
assessment of the spread and severity of COVID-19, that could affect whether a
direct threat still exists. 156

153.
154.
155.
156.

42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1137.
Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (EEOC) (Updated March 21, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/pandemic-preparedness-workplace-and-americans-disabilities-act (emphasis
added) (hereinafter Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace).
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The EEOC regulations are not binding and appear to contradict the Supreme
Court’s “direct threat” analysis by classifying the disease itself as a “direct
threat” rather than providing for an individualized assessment. 157
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he fact that some persons who have
contagious diseases [like COVID-19] may pose a serious health threat to others
under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the coverage of
Rehabilitation Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.” 158
Yet, the EEOC regulations for COVID-19 lump everyone with the disease into
the direct threat category regardless of circumstances. Instead, to protect
“disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear,” the Supreme Court requires an “individualized assessment” to
ensure that “the determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others [is] not based on generalizations or stereotypes.” 159 Just because
a person has a contagious disease like COVID-19, HIV, or tuberculosis does not
mean that person is a “direct threat” in all circumstances. For instance, a delivery
service might safely deliver food using contactless delivery to a person with
COVID-19 while in the hospital or inside their home without a direct threat
occurring due to the reasonable modification of contactless delivery.
Courts will not define the “COVID-19” disease as a “direct threat;” instead,
they will conduct an individualized assessment as to whether the specific
individual with COVID-19 risk poses a “direct threat” based on reasonable
judgment that relies on current medical knowledge and the best available factspecific, objective evidence. 160 To make a determination, courts will consider:
“(1) the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (2) the probability that the
potential injury will actually occur; and (3) whether reasonable modifications of
policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.” 161 During the analysis,
public health authorities, like the CDC, will be given “special weight and
authority” for current medical knowledge and evaluating “reasonable medical
judgments.” 162 See Section II.A.1. above for more analysis of when COVID-19
constitutes a “direct threat.”
As noted above, physical examinations and medical inquiries may be
employed by public accommodations as screening or eligibility criteria in
response to COVID-19 risks. Title III offers no specific guidance regarding
physical examinations and medical inquiries of customers and clients by public

157. Id. (The document notes: “[t]he contents of this document do not have the force and effect
of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide
clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.”).
158. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
159. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998).
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accommodations, 163 so Title I of the ADA’s restrictions on employers may be
instructive. The ADA prohibits employers from requiring medical examinations
and making “disability-related inquiries” of their employees except under
limited circumstances. 164 Medical examinations or inquiries for employees must
be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 165 The EEOC defines a
“medical examination” as a “procedure or test that seeks information about an
individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.” 166
Medical exams and inquiries are “consistent with business necessity when
an employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that . . . an
employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.” 167 Similar
regulations could be promulgated for inquiries by public accommodations,
requiring a public accommodation to have a “reasonable belief” that the
individual poses a “direct threat” to other customers, clients, or its employees.
Public accommodations performing medical examinations and inquiries will
likely need to demonstrate that these measures do not screen out protected
individuals with disabilities, that they are a business necessity (e.g., to eliminate
a direct threat), and that no reasonable modifications can be made to prevent the
discrimination. The reliability of the “objective evidence” used to formulate a
public accommodation’s “reasonable belief” that a person poses a direct threat
will be important.
Fever checkpoints are one proposed medical examination or inquiry to
identify COVID-19 direct threats and are examined here as an example of the
analysis likely to apply to similar measures. 168 For example, the airlines and
TSA are talking about “using airport security screeners to perform temperature
checks on passengers before they board aircraft,” and some public
accommodations are enacting similar measures. 169 In addition, infrared scanners
may be used at large venues (like stadiums) where the crowd can be scanned to
identify people with fevers. 170

163. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).
164. Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace, supra note 156.
165. Id.
166. Id. (To determine whether or not something is a “medical examination,” factors like
“whether the test involves the use of medical equipment” and “whether it is designed to reveal the
existence of a physical or mental impairment” are relevant.)
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Alan Levine et al., Airport Screeners May Check for Fever Under Plan Being Discussed,
BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-01/airportscreeners-may-check-for-fever-under-plan-being-discussed [https://perma.cc/NX6L-FK3D].
169. Id.
170. An Nguyen et al., Comparison of 3 Infrared Thermal Detection Systems and Self-Report
for Mass Fever Screening, 16(11) EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1710 (Nov. 2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3294528/ [https://perma.cc/7PSR-Y2J9]; Eva
Xiao, COVID-19 Raises Demand for Temperature Scanners, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2020),
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Fevers are not diagnostic of COVID-19 and more often identify people with
other disabilities or ailments than people actually infectious with COVID-19, so
the use of fever checkpoints as “objective evidence” based on reasonable
judgment relying on current medical evidence that a person is a “direct threat”
is questionable. 171 One component of the analysis of direct threats is “the
probability that the potential injury will actually occur,” and the probability that
someone with a fever has COVID-19 is likely going to be quite small in most
locations—unless the location is experiencing a major COVID-19 outbreak. 172
For example, roughly 0.1% of the US population may have been infected with
COVID-19 during the week of May 25, 2020, which means that 99.9% did not
have COVID-19—so if they had a fever, it was likely from a different source. 173
Further, most people with COVID-19 do not have fevers. The CDC
estimates that 35% of COVID-19 positive individuals have no symptoms at
all. 174 Even within the population of COVID-19 patients that end up being
hospitalized, less than half have fevers upon presentation to the hospital. 175
Therefore, of those 0.1% of Americans with active COVID-19 on May 25, 2020,
the vast majority likely did not have a fever, and many likely had no symptoms
whatsoever. So, any fever found at a fever checkpoint is unlikely to be related
to COVID-19 in most scenarios.
Instead, the 99.9% of Americans without COVID-19 at the checkpoint will
likely have another explanation for the fever—some of which may run afoul of
the ADA. For example, around 17 million Americans (representing 5.2% of the

https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-raises-fever-for-infrared-skin-temperature-scanners11590066006 [https://perma.cc/XB7T-8KR3].
171. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
172. Id.; Klompas et al., supra note 93, at 63 (explaining that “[p]ublic health authorities define
a significant exposure to COVID-19 as face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with
symptomatic COVID-19 that is sustained for at least a few minutes (and some say more than 10
minutes or even 30 minutes)” and that “[t]he chance of catching COVID-19 from a passing
interaction in a public space is therefore minimal.”).
173. CDC COVID Data Tracker, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC),
https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/7T2A-EKJV] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020)
(For example, for the week ending May 25, 2020, there were 170,391 new cases of COVID-19
diagnosed); U.S and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.cen
sus.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/CA88-BHLM] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021); The math: So, if
the cases stay contagious for 3 weeks on average (conservative overestimate since CDC only
recommends 14 days quarantine) and the same number of cases were diagnosed during the previous
three weeks, a rough estimate of the total number of active cases of COVID-19 in the U.S. on May
25, 2020 is around 511,173 active COVID-19 cases (170,391 x 3), which represents roughly 0.1%
of the United States 329,701,500 people.
174. CDC Pandemic Planning, supra note 77; Azad, supra note 77.
175. Richardson et al., supra note 122, at 2052 (noting that fever was present in only 30.7% at
the time of hospital admission); Guan et al., supra note 31, at 1708 (finding 43.8% of the patients
had fever on admission).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

280

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:251

U.S. population) live with a history of cancer in the United States, 176 and many
of those individuals face multiple different causes of fever ranging from the
cancer itself, to chemotherapy, to immunocompromise, to fevers of unknown
origin. 177 These individuals surviving cancer generally pose no direct threat to
others—so policies and procedures that function as eligibility criteria that tend
to screen out people with cancer will likely be found to constitute disability
discrimination in violation of the ADA. 178
In addition, other causes of fever that are more common than COVID-19
undermine the use of fever checkpoints to categorize people as direct threats—
even though the person with a fever may not qualify for protection under the
ADA. For example, adults experience an average of two to four “common colds”
per year, which can sometimes be accompanied by fevers. 179 In addition,
seasonal influenza affects between 3% and 11% of the U.S. population each
year, which can also cause fevers. 180
In many ways, fever checkpoints treat everyone with a fever as though they
are a direct threat in a way that stereotypes people just as the ADA is designed
to prohibit. More research on the prevalence of COVID-19 in febrile populations
and the effectiveness of fever checkpoints in eliminating direct threats is needed
to justify their widespread adoption. Similar considerations will come into play
when evaluating other types of medical examinations and inquiries used by
public accommodations to identify and segregate individuals who may be
“direct threats” under the ADA.
2.

Making Reasonable Modification to Policies, Practices, and
Procedures to Protect People With Disabilities Defined by COVID-19

As noted above, many COVID-19 vulnerable individuals could qualify for
protection under the ADA at places of public accommodation. Disability
discrimination includes “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary . . . , unless the
176. Kimberly Miller et al., Cancer treatment and survivorship statistics 2019, 69(5)
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY CA: A CANCER JOURNAL FOR CLINICIANS 363, 363 (2019),
https://acsjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3322/caac.21565 [https://perma.cc/3C8N-CD
MV] (noting that “[m]ore than 16.9 million Americans…with a history of cancer were alive on
January 1, 2019.”).
177. Fever, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-andside-effects/physical-side-effects/low-blood-counts/fever.html [https://perma.cc/37TM-VYXR]
(last revised Feb. 1, 2020) (discussing multiple causes of fever in cancer patients).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(i).
179. Carol DerSarkissian, How often do adults get the common cold and who is at most risk,
WEBMD (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.webmd.com/cold-and-flu/qa/how-often-do-adults-get-thecommon-cold-and-who-is-most-at-risk [https://perma.cc/ZN44-24AH].
180. Jerome Tokars, et al., Seasonal incidence of symptomatic influenza in the United States,
66(10) CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1511, 1511 (May 2, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC5934309/ [https://perma.cc/UW9N-RCJN].
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entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of [their business].” 181 The CDC recommends that vulnerable
people at “higher risk of getting very sick from COVID-19” practice social
distancing, stay away from people who are sick, limit close contact with other
people, wash their hands frequently, avoid crowds, avoid non-essential travel,
and to “stay home as much as possible,” among other recommendations. 182
Public accommodations should make reasonable modifications to their policies,
practices, and procedures to help facilitate this protected populations’ attempts
to follow the CDC guidelines. Failure to make reasonable modifications that do
not fundamentally alter the business to protect vulnerable individuals with
disabilities could still be found to be discriminatory under the ADA if such
failure effectively denies services to those populations by making the public
accommodation inaccessible without having too high of a risk for serious injury.
Whether a particular modification is reasonable “involves a fact-specific,
case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the
modification in light of the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the
organization that would implement it.” 183 Potentially “reasonable
modifications” of policies, practices, or procedures may include implementing
face mask requirements, altering operating hours (including special times
exclusively for vulnerable populations), health screening and testing of
employees, implementing special cleaning procedures, and restriction of visitors
to places where vulnerable populations are known to congregate (e.g., nursing
homes, hospitals), among others. 184 The need for these types of modifications
will depend upon the recommendations of public health authorities and on
scientific evidence of effectiveness proving the proposed modification is
reasonable and “necessary” under the statute.
For an example of the analysis, face mask requirements are being adopted
by many public accommodations. Under the ADA, a face mask requirement
needs to be “reasonable,” “necessary,” and not “fundamentally alter” the nature
of the public accommodation to be required. 185
Several factors make face mask requirements seem “reasonable.” First, the
CDC recommends that people cover their mouth and nose with a cloth covering
when around others, including when they have to go out in public, for example

181. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(ii).
182. CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119.
183. Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Baughman v. Walt
Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that facilities “need only make
accommodations that are reasonable,” which can include an analysis of the “costs of such
accommodations, disruptions of their business and safety.”).
184. CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2).
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to the grocery store to assist with social distancing recommendations. 186 Second,
some large businesses are already adopting masking policies; for example, the
large airlines “all adopted policies requiring that passengers wear face masks
during flights.” 187 Third, at least one state governor has issued an executive order
stating that “[a]ll patrons in the Commonwealth [of Virginia] aged ten and over
shall when . . . spending time inside [buildings] cover their mouth and nose with
a face covering.” 188 Fourth, universal masking might arguably help prevent
asymptomatic spread, which has been described as an “Achilles’ heel” in
containment strategies and may be particularly important in places where
vulnerable people congregate. 189 Fifth, masks serve as “visible reminders of an
otherwise invisible yet widely prevalent pathogen and may remind people of the
importance of social distancing and other infection-control measures.” 190
Finally, masks are “talismans that may help increase . . . perceived sense of
safety, well-being, and trust. . . [even if] such reactions may not be strictly
logical.” 191
186. Social distancing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html
[https://perma.cc/XTB7-G7BT] (hereinafter CDC Social Distancing); see also Cloth Face
Coverings: Questions and Answers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC),
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/86438/cdc_86438_DS1.pdf?#:~:text=Cloth%20face%20covering
s%20should%20not,remove%20the%20cover%20without%20assistance. [https://perma.cc/74WT
-T8CH] (stating, however, that “[c]loth face coverings should NOT be placed on children under
age 2, anyone who has trouble breathing, or is unconscious, incapacitated, or otherwise unable to
remove the mask without assistance.”).
187. Alan Levine et al., Airport screeners may check for fever under plan being discussed,
BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-01/airportscreeners-may-check-for-fever-under-plan-being-discussed [https://perma.cc/LP5C-CYXN].
188. Executive Order Number 63 (2020), Requirement to wear face covering while inside
buildings, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Effective May 29, 2020),
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-63-and-Or
der-Of-Public-Health-Emergency-Five—-Requirement-To-Wear-Face-Covering-While-InsideBuildings.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM7D-3RVW].
189. Gandhi et al., supra note 92, at 2158–59 (noting that 71% of “presymptomatic persons had
viable virus by culture 1 to 6 days before the development of symptoms.”); Melissa Arons et al.,
Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections and transmissions in a skilled nursing facility, 382 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 2081, 2081 (May 28, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056
/NEJMoa2008457 [https://perma.cc/W88H-W9LP] (showing rapid spread in a nursing home
population to 64% of residents within 23 days of the first positive test). But see Ruiyun, supra note
2, at 489 (noting that the “transmission rate of undocumented infections per person was 55% the
transmission rate of documented infections, yet, because of their greater numbers, undocumented
infections were the source of 79% of the documented cases.”); Klompas et al., supra note 93, at
63(2) (noting that the risks posed by asymptomatic individuals is mitigated somewhat by the fact
that the “transmission risk from [asymptomatic infected people] is likely to be lower than the risk
of spread from symptomatic patients”).
190. Klompas et al., supra note 93, at 63(2).
191. Id.
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In contrast, whether or not face masks are “necessary” is much more
controversial. The effectiveness of masks outside of a health care environment
where workers are in direct contact with known COVID-19 positive patients is
debated. One group of researchers states, “We know that wearing a mask outside
health care facilities offers little, if any, protection from infection.” 192 The
researchers explain that the “chance of catching COVID-19 from a passing
interaction in a public space is . . . minimal” because a significant exposure to
COVID-19 requires “face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with
symptomatic COVID-19” for possibly ten to thirty minutes according to some
“public health authorities.” 193 These researchers note that universal masking and
overuse may actually be harmful by leading “to more transmission of COVID19 if it diverts attention from implementing more fundamental infection-control
measures” and by causing a “future risk of running out of masks and thereby
exposing [front-line] clinicians to the much greater risk of caring for
symptomatic patients without a mask.” 194 Further, at least one randomized
control study found that cloth masks may actually increase infection rates stating
“the results [of their study] caution against the use of cloth masks” with the
“increased risk of infection” associated with cloth masks due to “[m]oisture
retention, reuse, . . . and poor filtration.” 195 However, a different study found
that as a public health control measure, if universal masking was adopted so that
80–90% of people wore masks in public, then COVID-19 could be eliminated
completely. 196 These scientists acknowledge that more research into the
effectiveness of masking is needed and will likely be performed. 197
Face mask design likely plays a role in the effectiveness of any masking
recommendations. “Turbulent gas cloud dynamics [see discussion below under
distancing measures] should influence the design and recommended use of
surgical and other masks,” which “can be used both for source control (i.e.,
reducing spread from an infected person) and for protection of the wearer (i.e.,
preventing spread to an unaffected person).” 198 For example, the “protective
efficacy of N95 masks depends on their ability to filter incoming air from
192. Id. at 63(1).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 63(2).
195. C. Raina MacIntyre et al., A cluster randomized trial of cloth masks compared with
medical masks in healthcare workers, 5 BMJ OPEN e006577 (2015), https://bmjopen.bmj.com
/content/5/4/e006577 [https://perma.cc/S7RV-M99W] (The researchers concluded that “as a
precautionary measure, cloth masks should not be recommended for [health care workers],
particularly in high-risk situations, and guidelines need to be updated.”).
196. De Kai, et al., Universal masking is urgent in the COVID-19 pandemic, ARXIV 1, 15–16
(submitted Apr. 22, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13553.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNB6-2RKH].
197. Id. at 3, 16–17.
198. Lydia Bourouiba, Turbulent gas clouds and respiratory pathogen emissions: Potential
implications for reducing transmission of COVID-19, 323(18) JAMA 1837, 1838 (May 12, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2763852 [https://perma.cc/3H67-N6TY].
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aerosolized droplet nuclei,” but “these masks are only designed for a certain
range of environmental and local conditions and a limited duration of usage,”
which may not be effective under certain circumstances—including many of
those advocated in public accommodations. 199
At present, without more research, a court would likely be hard-pressed to
find that mandatory masking in most public accommodations is “necessary” as
an ADA requirement—although given the surprising politization of the issue,
legal challenge outcomes are likely to be unpredictable and variable.
Finally, public accommodations might argue that masks fundamentally alter
the nature of their business. Although masking is common in some cultures, it
is not commonly practiced in the United States and may make some patrons
uncomfortable or unwilling to participate in the public accommodation’s
business—costing the business customers and clients, especially in areas where
masking has been politicized. Further, masking may cause some people anxiety
as a reminder of the pandemic and widespread fear surrounding them, just as
seeing people without masks causes others anxiety about possible contagion
(reasonable or not). One group of researchers viewed “the desire for widespread
masking” to be a “reflexive reaction to anxiety over the pandemic.” 200 Anxiety
is likely present on both sides of this issue, so the presence of masks might be
seen as a fundamental alteration in places of public accommodation in locations
where the support for mandatory masking is minimal.
Some special places of public accommodation involving healthcare may be
required by the ADA to adopt masking protocols since there is more agreement
on their effectiveness in these environments. One such population is the 1.3
million Americans residing in nursing homes where “symptom ascertainment
may be unreliable in a group in which more than half the residents [have]
cognitive impairment” and therefore they may be less likely to report more
subtle symptoms like sore throat, among others. 201 “Rapid and widespread
transmission” of COVID-19 has been demonstrated in skilled nursing facilities,
and the case fatality rate in one facility was 26%. 202 Surgical masking of all
nursing home staff and visitors may also be an important measure according to
some researchers. 203
In short, courts will likely decide whether requested modifications under the
ADA to policies, practices, or procedures—like mandatory face masking—are
reasonable and necessary using an individualized assessment of the plaintiff and
the public accommodation based on emerging scientific evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the requested modification. Public accommodations would be
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Klompas et al., supra note 93, at 63(1).
Gandhi et al., supra note 92, at 2159.
Arons et al., supra note 189, at 2081.
Gandhi et al., supra note 92, at 2159.
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well-advised to follow guidelines established by public health authorities like
the CDC that do not fundamentally alter their businesses, although their failure
to do so may or may not ultimately run afoul of the ADA.
3.

Removing Structural Barriers Impacting People With COVID-19Related Disabilities

Public accommodations have an obligation to protect vulnerable people with
disabilities by making reasonable structural modifications to allow protected
individuals with disabilities the opportunity to practice social distancing and
follow other CDC recommendations while enjoying their amenities. 204 Public
accommodations also have an obligation to provide services to people with
disabilities who may be contagious with COVID-19 where doing so can be done
safely. 205
Under Title III of the ADA, disability discrimination includes “a failure to
remove [structural] architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily
achievable” or “where . . . the removal of a barrier . . . is not readily achievable,
a failure to [use] . . . alternative methods if such methods are readily
achievable.” 206 “Readily achievable” modifications are those defined as “easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or
expense.” 207 “Difficulty” is not further defined, but the Supreme Court has noted
that the language of the statute “indicates that it extends to considerations in
addition to cost” and the determination should take into account the impact upon
the facility’s operation. 208
The regulations provide a non-exclusive list of examples of barrier removal
and include some that may be related to protecting people who are vulnerable to
COVID-19 like “[r]earranging tables, chairs, vending machines, display racks,
and other furniture [e.g., to allow for “social distancing”]; . . . [i]nstalling
flashing alarm lights [e.g., for overcrowded areas]; . . . [e]liminating a turnstile
or providing an alternative accessible path [e.g., to provide contactless entry];
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2).
205. Id.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(iv)–(v).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(iv).
208. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 120 (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
In determining whether an action is readily achievable, factors to be considered include:
[(1)] the nature and cost of the action needed, [(2)] the overall financial resources of the
facility . . .; the number of persons employed . . . ; the effect on expenses and resources, or
the impact otherwise . . . [(3)] the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type, and location of its facilities,” and [(4)] the type of operation or operations
of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce
of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
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. . . [and] [i]nstalling accessible door hardware [e.g., to provide touchless entry
and exit].” 209 Other similar COVID-19-related measures include installing
barriers between customers and employees, installing traffic flow
arrows/signage and other types of barriers to minimize contact between
customers, installing markers in areas where lines may accumulate to mark six
feet intervals between patrons, setting up entry points at stores that count and
limit the capacity of buildings to allow enough space for social distancing (e.g.,
limited number of customers per square foot), placing hand sanitizer in strategic
locations, and providing curbside and/or contactless delivery (e.g., to allow
COVID-19 contagious individuals with disabilities to participate safely). Public
accommodations should be attentive to structural barriers to physical distancing
between patrons throughout their businesses, including areas that might be
neglected like elevators and shuttle buses. Elevators may require special signage
and may require a designated employee to ensure one family/related group at a
time to avoid prolonged close contact between unrelated patrons.
Most of the structural modifications noted above are designed to allow
vulnerable individuals to follow social distancing guidelines, and ultimately, the
legal analysis of the reasonableness of social distancing rules and any ADA
requirements will likely come down to their science. The CDC recommends that
people practice “social distancing,” which includes “keeping space between
yourself and other people who are not from your household” and limiting “faceto-face contact with others.” 210 The CDC’s specific recommendations for social
distancing include: (1) staying at least six feet from other people, (2) not
gathering in groups, (3) staying out of crowded places, and (4) avoiding mass
gatherings. 211 Public accommodations can make some of the structural
modifications noted above to help facilitate the CDC’s social distancing
recommendations, which the CDC says is “especially important for people who
are at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19” in the vulnerable
population discussed above and protected by the ADA. 212
In contrast, the World Health Organization (WHO) takes a slightly different
stance with regard to social distancing than the CDC. 213 WHO says, “You can
reduce your chances of being infected or spreading COVID-19 by . . . .
[m]aintain[ing] at least 1 [meter (3 feet)] distance between yourself and
others.” 214 WHO explains that “[w]hen someone coughs, sneezes, or speaks they
spray small liquid droplets from their nose or mouth which may contain virus,”
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) (4), (7), (10), (11).
CDC Social Distancing, supra note 186.
Id.
Id.
See generally Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) advice for the public, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-forpublic [https://perma.cc/69MM-QB4G].
214. Id.
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and “[i]f you are too close, you can breathe in the droplets, including the
COVID-19 virus if the person has the disease.” 215 WHO also recommends
“[a]void[ing] going to crowded places” to allow you to maintain their three feet
rule. 216
The science behind these social distancing rules seems a little less certain
than the specific guidelines and will likely play a role in any ADA requirements
by courts. According to medical researchers, the CDC and WHO
recommendations are based on our “current understanding of the routes of hostto-host transmission in respiratory infectious diseases [that] are predicated on a
model of disease transmission developed in the 1930s that, by modern standards,
seems overly simplified.” 217 In the 1930s, William F. Wells studied tuberculosis
transmission and “dichotomized respiratory droplet emissions into ‘large’ and
‘small’ droplets” (or aerosols), which “mediate transmission of respiratory
disease.” 218 Subsequent “[i]nfection control strategies were then developed
based on whether a respiratory infectious disease is primarily transmitted via the
large or the small droplet route.” 219 Today, this dichotomy of large versus small
droplets developed in the 1930s “remains at the core of the classification systems
of routes of respiratory disease transmission adopted by the [WHO and the
CDC]” with “arbitrary droplet diameter cutoffs, from 5 to 10 [micrometers]”
used to “categorize host-to-host transmission as droplets or aerosol routes.” 220
These classifications “continue to underly current risk management, major
recommendations, and allocation of resources for response management
association with infection control” for COVID-19. 221 The rapid international
spread of COVID-19 “[e]ven when maximum containment policies were
enforced…suggests that using arbitrary droplet size cutoffs may not accurately
reflect what actually occurs with respiratory emissions, possibly contributing to
the ineffectiveness of some procedures used to limit the spread of respiratory
disease.” 222
One new model for respiratory emissions shows that sneezes, coughs, and
exhalations “are primarily made of a multiphase turbulent gas (a puff) cloud that
entrains ambient air and traps and carries within it clusters of droplets with a
continuum of droplet sizes,” instead of only “mucosalivary droplets following

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Bourouiba, supra note 198, at 1837 (explaining that “[i]mplementing public health
recommendations based on these older models [from the 1930s] may limit the effectiveness of the
proposed interventions.”).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Bourouiba, supra note 198, at 1837.
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short-range semiballistic emission trajectories.” 223 In this new model, the
“locally moist and warm atmosphere within the turbulent gas cloud allows the
contained droplets to evade evaporation for much longer than occurs with
isolated droplets,” which extends “the lifetime of a droplet” by up to a factor of
1000, “from a fraction of a second to minutes.” 224 In addition, the forward
momentum of the cloud allows “pathogen-bearing droplets” of all sizes trapped
in the turbulent hot and moist gas cloud to be carried up to twenty-three to
twenty-seven feet (seven to eight meters) depending upon environmental
conditions in the ambient air like temperature, humidity, and airflow. 225 After
the cloud evaporates (which is “poorly understood”), some “residues or droplet
nuclei” may “stay suspended in the air for hours, following airflow patterns
imposed by ventilation or climate-control systems.” 226 A report from China
“demonstrated that [the COVID-19] virus particles could be found in the
ventilation systems in hospital rooms of patients with COVID-19,” which is
“more consistent with the turbulent gas cloud hypothesis of disease transmission
than the dichotomous model [from the 1930s] because it explains how viable
virus particles can travel long distances from patients.” 227 The clinical
implications of these findings is unknown. 228
The WHO (three feet) and CDC (six feet) distance recommendations for
social distancing do not take into account “the possible presence of a highmomentum cloud carrying the droplets long distances” and the three to six feet
recommendations likely “underestimate the distance, timescale, and persistence
over which the cloud and its pathogenic payload travel, thus generating an
underappreciated potential exposure range.” 229
Therefore, under the scrutiny of expert testimony in a court proceeding, a
requested structural modification may or may not be determined to be
objectively reasonable and necessary regardless of the recommendations of
public health authorities—although public accommodations would be wise to
make reasonable modifications where readily achievable to accommodate the
CDC’s recommendations. In addition, public accommodations should find ways
to remove barriers to service of COVID-19 contagious individuals with
disabilities safely where possible. 230
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1838.
227. Bourouiba, supra note 198, at 1838.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a dentist “is not
entitled to demand absolute safety” in dealing with HIV positive patients and that “remote
theoretical possibility of HIV transmission through tears, saliva, and urine” were not significant
risks—similar analysis will likely apply to COVID-19 regarding requiring “absolute safety”).
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V. CONCLUSION
COVID-19 has permanently changed the way public accommodations like
restaurants, theaters, medical facilities, sports arenas, gyms, and many other
proprietors of mainstream American activities must operate in order to
accommodate people with COVID-19-related disabilities under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The required modifications will affect all clients,
customers, and employees of these establishments by changing the way that
activities are conducted in these venues.
Newly defined COVID-19-related disability groups are emerging under the
ADA. The biggest and most diverse group of newly defined individuals with
disabilities includes vulnerable individuals who are susceptible to COVID-19
complications and death due to underlying medical conditions like diabetes,
hypertension, moderate to severe asthma, immunocompromise, severe obesity,
and old age, among others. 231 In addition, individuals actually impaired by
severe cases of COVID-19, survivors of severe cases of COVID-19, and
individuals stigmatized due to COVID-19 will be due special attention in public
accommodations under the ADA.
As discussed in depth above, public accommodations will need to
affirmatively take actions to allow people with ADA-defined disabilities related
to COVID-19 to fully and equally enjoy their goods and services by
implementing carefully thought out eligibility criteria necessary to eliminate
direct threats by (1) reasonably modifying policies, practices, and procedures
that do not fundamentally alter the nature of their businesses and (2) removing
structural barriers where readily achievable. Continued attention to emerging
scientific and epidemiologic data will be important for public accommodations
to successfully navigate the complex and controversial requirements potentially
placed upon them by this latest contagion. Measures like fever checks,
mandatory face masking, and required social distancing will continue to be
scrutinized by scientists, public opinion, and the legal community. Courts will
likely struggle and disagree in early evaluations of COVID-19-related
requirements as highlighted in this article—just as they have in the past with
regard to measures related to other contagious diseases like HIV and
tuberculosis.

231. CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119; Richardson et al., supra note 122, at 2052.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

290

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:251

